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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
UTAH SAND AND GRAVEL PRODUCTS
CORPORATION,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
11341

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
Statement of the Nature of the Case

Cond6mnation giving rise to damages for taking
of .92 acres and claimed severance damage to portion of remaining property by closing of access.
Disposition in Lower Court

The case was tried to a jury. A fair award was
given for the property taken. From that portion of
the verdict and judgment finding no damages resulting from the closing of access, defendant appeals.
Relief Sought on Appeal

Defendant seeks a new trial on the question of
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damages resulting from the closing by the State of
existing access to U.S. 89.
Statement of Facts

Defendant owned property on both sides of
U.S. 89 running south about 921 feet from the Weber
River. (Plaintiff's Exhibit A) The State of Utah in improving U.S. 89 from Harrison Blvd. in Ogden to
Farmington Junction sought in this proceeding to
widen the highway and in so doing took a narrow
strip of defendant's property on each side of said
highway consisting of a total of .92 acres. The State
also sought in this proceeding to establish a limited
access line on both sides of U.S. 89.
Summons was served upon the defendant on
March 1, 1965, and after commencement of the action, defendant sought approval of the State Road
Commission to establish direct access from its property onto U.S. 89 but was refused (Def. Exhibits l
and 2) notwithstanding the fact that there had been
a direct access from defendant's property to U.S. 89
for many years preceding this closing by the State
(T. 50-51). The "limited access" line proposed by the
State thus became a non-access" line so far as it
affected this defendant (T. 31).
11

Defendant in its answer raised the issue that the
taking of its access was not reasonable nor necessary and asked that it be restored or in the alternative that damages resulting from the taking of access
be awarded m. 47).
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The question of the reasonableness or the
necessity of the taking of the access was closed and
taken from the jury by the court who described it
to the jury early in the trial as virtually an absolute
right (T. 31) without determination as to the necessity of the taking of the access (T. 46).
It was the claim of the defendant that its property abutting U.S. 89, with access, became commercial in use and valuation as of the dates when I-80
exiting from Weber Canyon became known, long
before the taking by the State of the property and
access subject of this litigation. Mr. Knowlton testified that upon lea.ming I-,go would be coming down
Weber Canyon they were convinced that the chief
value of the subject property would be commercial
(T. 36). Again by offer of proof he stated the minute
it was known that J-80 would be coming down
Weber Canyon it was very evident that the subject
property thereafter had as its highest and best use
commercial development (T. 60-61, 188). Mr. Solomon testified by offer of proof that the location of
the subject property as the first privately owned
land available for commercial development south
of the off-ramps from I-80 rendered it commercial (T.
95), as of the date the location of the off-ramps from
I~80 became known (T. 101-102). Mr. Barlow by offer
of proof testified that the location of the off-ramps
from I-80 made the difference in the subject property
being valued commercial or for gravel reserves (T.
105-106). Mr. Knowlton testified by offer of proof
that the public meeting in Ogden wherein the State
Road Commission made known the location of the
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off-ramps from I-80 was held on May 29, 1959 (T. 187).
The I-80 project was attended with non-access lines.
The later improvement of U.S. 89 contemplated
limited access (Plaintiff's Exhibit A).
Defendant claimed that the commercial value
of Hs property was destroyed by the closing by the
State of defendant's access (T. 108). If the property
was not commercial there was no damage by closing direct access to U.S. 89 (T. 114). Mr. Joseph Ray
testified that he is president of the town board of
South Weber wherein the subject property lies (T.
63); that the said property at one time was zoned
commercial and was subsequently zoned G-1Gravel, which zoning applied at the time of the taking and since (T. 64). He further testified that the
probability was that an application to rezone the
property commercial would be favorably considered 0nd acted upon by the town board (T. 65).
The court refused to admit evidence of highest
and best use or value based in any way on the effect of construction or proposed construction of I-80
on defendant's land or surrounding values (T. 86,
109, 112). The cmirt further, without evidence to
justify its position, lectured the jury why the effect
of construction of I-80 must be disregarded (T. 8687). Again the crn lft misled the jury regarding the
law on this point in citing an example of Pine View
Dam (T. 115).
Forced by the court to assume that there was
no such thing as I-80, the defendant's experts were
compelled to testify that the remaining property
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would be valued as gravel land (T. 112, 115). One
witness wa_s prevented by the court from answering
as to the effect upon his opinion of the existence
of I-80 (T. 115).
Thus if the property was commercial, defendant
cla.imed to be damaged as a result of the closing of
access according to expert Barlow $22,373.00 (T. 109),
and according to expert Solomon $21,885.00 (T. 91g2). The jury was ne-;er permitted to hear this testimony. The record discloses 108 pages of evidence
before the jury and 72 pages of evidence by way of
off er of proof. Most of the offer of proof was evidence supporting defendant's theory that the effect
of the construction of I-80 on the potential use and
actual value of defendant's property was a proper
consideration.
Mr. Kay, called by the defendant as an adverse
witness, testified by way of offer of proof that he is
Chief Engineer for the Department of Highways for
Utah (T. 136). In 1956 Congress authorized the 40,000 miles of Interstate National Defense Highway
System (T. 138). Since 1-80 as originally contemplated, turned south at Echo Junction, the State
Road Commission requested that it also run west
from Echo I unction through Weber Canyon and into
Ogden (T. 141). This request was approved in October, 1957, and this new stretch of the Interstate
National Defense Highway system was denominated NI-80 (T. 142). On May 29, 1959, the State
Road Commission held a public meeting in Ogden
a.nd the proposed route of NI-80, its relationship and
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proximity to and north of the Weber River in the
vicinity of U.S. 89 and the location of the "on-off"
ramps where NI-80 crossed U.S. 89 were known and
discussed. (T. 144, 145) Approximately 3 weeks after
the said meeting the publicly discussed location of
the routes and "on-off" ramps became official and
confirmed (T. 144, 166) and it was known that in
order to construct that project it would not be necessary to take any property south of the Weber River
(T. 167).
U.S. Highway 89 had long been part of the Utah
Primary Highway System (T. 146) and as such was
separate and distinct from the new system approved
in 1956 (T. 147). Each state has a primary road system and these are intended to form a network.
I-80 and improvement of U.S. 89 were two separate projects (T. 152, 153).
In November of 1959, a preliminary study report of the traffic condition in Davis County was
printed within the State Road Commission wherein
the impact of population growth, changes of traffic
patterns and the 8ffect oi traffic to be generated by
NI-80 was contemplated (T. 163). The author recommended that U.S. 89 from Uintah Junction to Farmington Junction should be improved to move more
traffic faster (T. 175). At the time of this study it was
not known what specific improvements would be
made on U.S. 89 nor "''here nor to what extent, if at
all, these improvements wou]d touch or affect the
ground of the defendant (T. 170-171). Not until 1962
did the Road Commission begin to move forward in
planning improvements to U.S. 89 (T. 154).
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The court, in a leading and suggestive manner,
asked Mr. Kay if the project known as NI-80 and the
project known as F-030-1 (2) (the U.S. 89 project from
Uintah Junction to Cherry Lane) were "interwoven"
and the witness agreed that they were (T. 168).
The defendant's property taken and damaged
by the state in this case was part of the latter project. This project was the first stretch of U.S. 89 lying
south of NI-80 and south of the Weber River.
Although it had been gradually upgraded there
had been no major improvement of U.S. 89 in the
vicinity of the Weber River since before 1952 (T.
148). Traffic has increased annually since 1952 and
between 1957 and 1965 had increased annually from
six thousand units per day in 1957 (T. 203) to eleven
thousand units per day in 1965 (T. 208) and was by
1965 a problem (T. 204). Improvement of U.S. 89
regardless of the construction of NI-80 was indicated
(T. 156) and the study report of November of 1959
so stated (T. 175). Had I-80 not been in the picture
the same design criteria would have been used in
improving U.S. 89 (T. 196).
The court refused to permit the defendant's appraiser witnesses to consider the effect of the 1959
anticipated construction of NI-80 on the value or
use of the defendant property as of March 1, 1965,
the date of the taking (T. 86, 112). Indeed, the court
in the presence of the jury, told the appraiser witnesses in arriving at their opinions of value of defendant's land at the time of the taking (March I,
l 965) that they must ignore NI-80 and assume that
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it was not there (T. 112). Since NI-80 had been one

of the accepted facts of life bearing on property
values since before June of 1959, this created an
impossible task for defendant's appraisers.

In its instructions, the court advised the jury it
should consider values as of the date the summons
was issued, to wit: March 1, 1965 (R. 89, Instruction
No. 2).
However, elsewhere in its instructions, the
court confused the jury as to which project the "onoff" ramps attached to and again instructed the jury
that they must disregard the effect of I-80 in determining market value (R. 92, Instruction No. 5).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
STATE COULD NOT TAKE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT OF
ACCESS TO U.S. 89 WITHOUT A DETERMINATION OF
THE NECESSITY THEREFOR.

The State refused to grant access to U.S. 89 from
defendant's remaining ground. The State further
refused to permit a break in the limited access line
merely to permit traffic on U.S. 89 traveling south to
exit from the highway onto defendant's property.
Under these facts defendant was entitled to a determination by the court based on evidence whether
the state's action in imposing a non-access on the
defendant's remaining land was necessary. As appears from pages 31 and 46 of the trial transcript the
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court did not properly view its statutory power to
review the Commission's action.
78-34-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
reads:
"Conditions precedent to taking.-Before property can be taken it must appear:
(2)

That the taking is necessary to such use;"

78-34-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, reads:
"Powers of Court or Judge-The court or judge
thereof shall have power:
( 1) To determine the conditions specified in
section 78-34-4 ;"

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT
DEFENDANT'S WITNESSES OR THE JURY TO CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF
I-80 AND ITS OFF-RAMPS ON THE USE AND VALUE
OF DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY.

Essentially the question presented to the court
is "should the defendant, condemnee, be permitted
to claim enhancement of value of his property resulting from the prior planning and construction by
the State of project I-80 near the property of the condemnee subsequently taken by the state in its construction of improvements on U.S. 89."
I-80 was authorized by Congress in 1956 and
authorized down Weber Canyon in 1957. A public
meeting in May of 1959 made known the planned
location of on-off ramps on I-80 where it inter-
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changed with U.S. 89. In June of 1959 the location
and identity of the on-off ramps of I-80 at its interchange with U.S. 89 became official and confirmed.
As of that time the property of the defendant, subject of this litigation, was the first privately owned
property south of the I-80 project on U.S. 89 and its
potential use thereby changed from gravel reserve
to commercial. The date of the taking of the property in question for the improvement of U.S. 89 was
March 1, 1965.
78-34-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides:
''For the purpose of assessing compensation and
damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to have
accrued at the date of the service of summons, and
its actual value at that date shall be the measure
of compensation for all property to be actually taken,
and the basis of damag·es to property not actually
taken, but injuriously affected, in all cases where such
damages are allowed, as provided in the next preceding section. No improvements put upon the property
subsequent to the date of service of summons shall be
included in the assessment of compensation or damages."

In 4 Nichols, on Eminent Domain, Third Edition,
pages 201-211, Section 12.3151 on the subject of "Effect of Proposed Taking," we find the following:
''(a) Where location of proposed project is
definite. The rule has heen stated to be that the
owner of land taken bv eminent domain is not entitled to receive any ii:-icrease in the value of such
land where the fact is that the land was known to
be within the area designated for condemnation and
was certain to be taken.'
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( b) Where the location of the proposed project is indefinite. "* * * it is usually held that the
owner is entitled to the benefit of the appreciation
in value from the general expectation that the improvement for which it was taken would soon be constructed."
( c) Where there is a supplemental taking. "If
a definite area has already been condemned, the market value of the neighboring property is naturally affected thereby. If an enhancement in value results
such property is entitled to the benefit thereof. It
follows that if the original project is subsequently enlarged so as to embrace additional property, such additional property as is involved in the supplemental
taking is entitled to the benefit of any enhancement
in value which resulted from the original taking. If,
however, the public project from the beginning included the taking of certain tracts, but only one of
them is taken in the first instance, the owner of the
other tracts should not be allowed an increased value
for his lands which are ultimately taken."

In Orgel, on Valuation, under Eminent Domain,
Volume 1, 2d Edition, we find the following:
"Sec. 98 * ~, * In the present chapter, we must
consider two types of situations: First, those in which
uncertainty as to the precise location of the improvement causes an enhancement in the value of property subsequently condemned and second, those in
which the land taken was from the outset definitely
designated for inclusion in the project. * * *
"We may surmise that the bulk of condemnation cases do not come within either of the two
groups discussed in the preceding paragraphs, but
rather that most cases fall athwart both groups. * * *
"Sec. 99, p. 427: "* * * Insofar as the factual
basis of the decisions may be determined from the
opinions, the cases fall into three general classifica-
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tions: First, those in which the land taken was
marked for use in the project from the beginning;
second, cases in which the land taken was not within
the original scope of the project, but was needed for
expansion or for purposes which might be regarded as
incidental to the project; third, cases in which the
general location of the pro3ect is fixed, but the exact
location or the extent thereof is uncertain. In general, in those cases falling in the first group, no enhancement in value is allowed, and in cases involving
the second and third factual classifications enhancement in value due to proximity to an established or
definitely planned improvement is allowed."
Sec. 104, p. 443, Benefits Anticipated from One
Continuous Scheme of Development v. Benefits Con·
ferred by S~parate Projects. "While the decisions of
the courts are not in accord on the question whether
an enhancement in value caused by the very im·
provement for which the land is taken should be
considered, rhey would probably all agree that an in·
crease in value of land resulting from a prior and sep·
arate improvement should be allowed. Thus, if there
is an anticipated rise in value hecause of a projected
street on which the property will front, and if this
land is subsequently taken for park purposes, its en·
hanced value by reason of the anticipated benefits to
result from the projected street improvement will be
allowed." (Emphasis added)
" * ':' * Other courts that have sustained awards
of enhanced values have sometimes fortified their
holdings by a findi11g· that the project which engendered the inciemeni is not the s~une as that for
which the land is takPn.

"The courts haw~ not clearlv defined the criteria

by which we may determine ~hether the improve·

ment that causes the enhancement in value is part
of the project for whirh the land is condemned. * ':' *
" ':' * * In McChristy v. Hall County (Texas.
1940), 140 S.W. (?d) fi76. where land had previously
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been acquired for a highway and construction had
been started, in a proceeding to condemn land for a
borrow pit the value of the land as enhanced by the
proposed highway was allowed, the court saying:
"The fact that previous improvements have
been made by the condemner or others is a factor which it is proper to consider in arriving at
its [the land's] value. * * *
"The owner may be able to sell his land to
others at the value to which it is enhanced by
the location of the road and we conceive no
reason why he should be penalized merely because it is desired by the public. * * * "

In Vol. 27, American Jurisprudence (2d), Eminent Domain, the following is stated:
Sec. 281, p. 74, "The test of market value is not
the property's value for a special purpose, but its
fair market value in view of all purposes to which
it is natural1y adapted. But this is not to say that
a special purpose to which the land may be adapted
is necessarily of no significance. As a general thing,
the adaptability of the land sought to be taken in
eminent domain for a special purpose or use may be
considered as an element of value, unless it is an
illegal use or unless the land owner, after receiving
knowledge that the land is to be condemned, puts
it to a special use merely for the purpose of increasing the compensation or damages."
Sec. 284, p. 82: " * * * But where the taking
of the land was not conceived as a part of the original
project but as an independent enterprise subsequently undertaken in connection with the original project, * * * the owner of land taken for the purpose
of extending or enlarging the original project is entitled to the enhancement in the value of the land
due to the improvement."
Sec. 356, p. 203: "Where a condemnor, by a
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prior eminent domain proceeding, has acquired som~
right in an owner's property and by a second proceeding. seeks to ~cquire a further right for the public use, the dnmages in such second appropriation
would apparently he the value of the property in its
then situation, irrespective of the fact that under the
prior proceeding a part of the property has been
taken. The situation vrnuld seem to be no different
than as if the owner of the property had sold the
right which was taken in the first eminent domain
proceeding, leavin~ him with some interest, or a
limited interest, in the property. The questinn as to
the amount of damages would, therefore, be the value
of this interest. regardless of the fact that it was, at
one time, pl'lrt of a larger tract. (See State Highway
Com. v. Stumbo (Ore.) 31)2 P. (2), 478.

A major annotation on the subject "Incremenl
to Value, from project for which land is condemned
as a factor in fixing compensation" is found in 147
A.LR., pages 66-103. Attention of the court is called
to the following pertinent statements made in thal
annotation:
P. 84, "Some of the cases either intimate or recognize the rule that the owner is entitled to the in·
crement in value accruing to the land before any
definite det0rmination of the location of the improve·
ment and at a time when though there was an expectation or even a reasonable certaintv that the
improvement would he constructcrl in ·the general
neighborhood of the hnd in question, there was no
certainty of any kind that the land in question would
be included in or taken for the project; and that, a
fortiori, this is true where there was a reasonable
expectation that the land in question would not he included in but wnnld ::idjoin the improvement."
( p. 81) lists the jurisdictions at the time of the
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annotation which stood for the view that the owner
is entitled to any increment due to the improvement
irrespective of whether it was known that the land
would be included in the project. Utah is not included
in the jurisdictions listed but it will be seen hereunder that Utah has since adopted this view.)
p. 88, V. Enlargement or Extension of Previously
Established Project. "Where a previously established
project is to be extended or enlarged by condemnation of adjacent land, the question whether the owner of the adjacent lands may recover as a part of his
compensation the enhancement in the value of the
land since the establishment of the original project
is frequently made to depend upon the question
whether at the time of the construction of the original project (a) it was contemplated that the land in
question would sooner or later be taken for the purposes of the project, 01· whether (b) the taking of it
was conceived, not as a part of the original project,
but as an independent enterprise subsequently undertaken in connection with the original project.
"In the former event, (a) supra, * * * enhancement after a practical certainty that the project will
include the land in question is not a part of the market value of the land for which the owner is entitled
to compensation * * *.
"But in the latter event, (b) supra, * * * enhancement prior to the determination of the location
of improvement and inclusion therein of the land in
question is a part of the market value of the land for
which the owner is entitled to compensation - the
owner of the land taken for the purpose of extending
or enlarging the original project is entitled to the enhancement in the value of the land due to the improvement."

As pointed out in 147 A.LR., p. 98, statutes of
some of the states contain a provision substantially
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to the effect that the owner shall be entitled to receive compensation for his land "irrespective of any
benefits" or "irrespective of increased value from
any improvements proposed by the condemnor."
The Utah Supreme Court by decision appears to
have a_ccepted thls philosophy.
See Weber Basin Water Conservancy District
v. Ward, et al., 10 Utah (2d) 29, 347 P. (2d) 862. In this
case, the trial court, Parley E. Norseth, Judge, had
permitted the jury to consider enhancement to the
property being taken or damaged resulting from
the improvements proposed by the condemnor. In
supporting the trial court, the Utah Supreme Court,
without dissent adopts that rule which permits the
owner of property being condemned to realize, as
part of his damages, the enhanced value of his property resulting from the proiect subject of the condemnation. The court c:~tes the Rhode Island case of
Stafford v. Providence, 14 Am. Rep. 710. In that case
the trial court refused to instruct the jury that it had
"no right to consider or make use of the fact" that
the land had been increased in value "by the pro·
posal or construction of the improvement.'' The
judgment was affirmed on appeal where the Rhode
Island Court held that the measure of compensation
was the market value of the land at the time it was
taken of whatever elements composed.

In settling the question for the State of Utah
and the trial courts herein, the Supreme Court stated
as follows:
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"We are in nccord with what appears to be the
better view, adopted hy the trial court, that the condemnee is entitled to the fair market value of his
property at the time of the service of summons in
the condemnation proceedings as provided by statute;
and that all factors bearing upon such value that any
prudent purchaser would take into account at that
time should be given consideration, including any
potential development in the area reasonably to be
expected." (Emphasis added.)

The above language of the Utah Supreme Court
has been subsequently referred to and quoted with
approval by the Utah Court in Southern Pacific Company v. Arthur. et al .• (1960) 10 Utah (2d) 306, 352 P.
(2d) 693, and State of Utah by and through its Road
Commission v. Wooley. (1964), 15 Utah (2d) 248, 390
P. (2) 860.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5, GIVEN TO THE JURY, THAT THE JURY
COULD GIVE NO EFFECT TO AND COULD NOT CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF T-80 IN ITS DELIBERATIONS.

See argument under point II. Furthermore, In3truction No. 5, is vague and ambiguous. All of the
evidence regarding the propriety of considering enhanced value resulting to defendant's property on
U.S. 89 as a result of project I-80 as well as evidence
of damage attributable thereto came in by way of
off er of proof and was not before the jury. The instruction merely twisted the knife that had previous}Y been thrust into defendant's theory of the case by
way of rulings on the evidence.

18
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR A MISTRIAL.

At page 88 and again at page 230 of the trial
transcript are recorded defendant's motions for mistrial on the grounds of errors including the error of
the court set forth in Point II herein.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE ANY
OF DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS.

Defendant's requested instructions number three
and four properly sta_ted the law of the State of Utah
applicable in this case:
Instruction No. 3
"You are instructed that in arriving at the value
of the property being acquired by the State of Utah
in this case, you shall determine such value by the
fair market value of such property at the date of
summons issued herein, to wit: March 1, 1965. Thr
term "market value" of the property means the price
it will bring when offered for sale by one who desires
but is not obligated to sell and is bought by one who
desires but is not obli?.·ate<l to purchase the property.
"In determining fair market value, you must
recognize the highest and best use to which the property is susceptible at the time of the taking and you
shall award damages based upon the fair market
value of the property for that highest and best use
to which it was susceptible." (R. 81)
Instruction No. 4
"In determining the highest and best use of the
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property at the time of the taking, you are not restricted to that nse to which the property may have
been put in the past, but you may consider all of the
evidence presented in this matter on this subject and
you may find the highest and best use of the property taken to be that use to which the property could
most profitably he put in order to realize its greatest
productivity. Thus, although the defendant may have
been satisfied to leave the property in an undeveloped
state or to have userl it in conjunction with its gravel
operations up to the time of the taking of the same,
nevertheless, if the property at the time of the taking
was susceptible for use for commercial or other purposes which would be the highest and best use of the
property then you shall award damages based on the
fair market value of the property for that highest and
best use.
''Likewise, in determining the highest and best
use to which the property could be put you are not
limited to that zoning restriction which may have
been in effect at the time of the taking. Rather, where
there is a probability that zoning restrictions will be
altered in the near future you should consider other
uses to which the property could be devoted in the
event of such a change." <R. 82)

Nowhere in the court's instructions was the jury
instructed that "Highest and Best Use" was a guiding concept. Forced by the court to disregard the
effect of I-80, testimony was nonetheless presented
by Mr. Knowlton that in his opinion the property
had commercial use at the time of the taking by
virtue of the mere increase in traffic over the years
un U.S. 89 (T. 212). He was discredited on crossPxamination by the fact that he had not applied for
commercial zoning (T. 215). Evidence had been re·-::eived that the probability was that an application
to rezone the property commercial would be ap-
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proved by the town of South Weber at the time o!
the taking as well as at the time of the trial. (T. 63-65)
The refusal of the court to give the above quoted in
structions prevented the jury from being properly
informed on the law to the prejudice of the defendant. See State of Utah by and through its Road
Commission v. Jacobs, 16 Utah(2) 167, 397 P(2) 463,
where the court said:

" * * * The owner of property under condemnation is entitled to a value based upon the highest and
best use to which it could be put at the time of the
taking, without limitation as to the use then actually made of it. However, the projected use, affecting
value. must be not only possible, but reasonably
probable. * '" *"
CONCLUSION
The defendant did not receive a fair trial. Proper
and material evidence in support of its theory o!
the case vras withheld from the jury. The jury was
both told and instructed to ignore and disregard
essential relevant and material facts. The jury was
not properly instructed as to the law applicable to
the evidence before it.
All witnesses agreed that the .92 acres actually
taken was gravel reserve. The state's witnesses valued it: Smith-$600 per ar=re; Caine, $1,000 per a.ere
The defendant's witnesses vah1ed it: Knowlton, $2,
000 per acre; Solomon, 3) 1,4'.?.9 per acre; Barlow, $3r
000 per acre. The jury fo1 md $2,000 per acre. That
portion of tl1e verd]ct and juogment should be affirmed.
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The defendant should be granted a new trial
to determine the just compensation which should
be awarded as a result of the taking of defendant's
access to U.S. 89. The court should be required to
receive evidence before determining whether the
taking of that access was "necessary." The jury
should be permitted to hear and consider the effect
of the projection and construction of I-80 with its attendant interchange and on-off ramps where it affected defendant's land values from prior to June
of 1959, nearly eight years before the taking
involved herein. The jury should be instructed to
assess damages based upon the "highest and best
use" to which the land could be put at the time of
the taking.
Respectfully submitted,

Ramon M. Child
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker

